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r -eommunirattonTO T11E izmTuns.Gin'mkmt's : As you have copied into your r» lututi* CoWuiei Pickering’s letter, published in a late i»on*ber of the North American Review, yen wtll oblige me bv giving publicity to a letter from General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to me, together wuh the few remarks which i sub-join to it.t!\»?onel Pickerings letter has been supposed bv the publisher of it, add by souie of his obsequious com men fa tors, to contradict some material fact* in my account of the battle of German -lawn. My object is to show, that, as far as that letter cao be regarded as evidence, it contains a direct and important confirmation of my narrative, anti in other respects that it is of no importance in the controversy on the occurrences in lhat battle ; that, in the h ading incidents in which I have deviated from other narratives, I have the highest authority to sustain roe; and that that authority is in no wi»e impaired by any thing contained in Colonel Pickering’s letter.Minor objects I am altogether indifferent about; n»j eSorts have been to maintain that Washington committed ao blonder, and Greene no delinquency, in that battle, and to these point I will show that Colonel Pickering’s letter is a most conclusive document.If the surprise was not complete ; if, contrary to the belief of the Commander in Chief at the time, the enemy were on the alert, and apprised of his approach—it is f*nough for his reputation to show, that he ne^Iected^no precaution to make i!ve surprise complete ; he was not responsible for the intervention of causes which he could not have anticipated.The following is a copy of Geneial Pinckney'sletter;Charleston, November 14, 1820Dkar Sir ; In giving you, some time ago, some account of the actions of Brandywine and Germantown, I recollect mentioning that I knew General Washington had very early detached a regiment of cavalry, commanded by Col. Bland, to keep as near as possible to the enemy’s left, with a view of obtaining early and authentic information of any movement they might make, and about 11 or 12 o’clock on that day, while we were near Colonel Proctor’* battery, on the height above Chad’s Ford* I heard him bitterly lament that Colonel Bland had not sent him any information at all, and the accounts he had re*ceived from others were of a very contradictory nature. About one o’clock, intelligence was brought that the enemy’* left wing were march* tng in the valley road, and were about crossingthe Brandywine above its Forks. At length, Colooel Bland seat intelligence that he had seentwo of the enemy’s brigades inarching in that road. Sullirun’s and Ijoril Stirling’s divisions were ordered to march up the Brandy wine to attack them in ease they should cross, and somef kit__A. O.sme lull or solders fell into their hands* General Knox exclaimed against the impolicy of leaving an inimical armed force in our rear, but the General said to me, 9i do tell the Colonel I have already directed the army to file off to the right and ieft;” and ordered Colonel Ogden tofremain with his regiment to watch the house, and to fall on the soldiers in it if they attempted to quit it.I think there never was a battle in which a commander took more care fo ensure success than General Washington did at the battle of Germantown, and I attribute the loss of it principally to the thickness of the fog, which did not permit us to see immediately where the enemy retreated, by which means our soldiers continued firing and expending their ammunition, when the enemy were gone, and before the march forward was resumed, and this happened two or three timex before we arrived at Chew’s house, so that when the General ordered us to rally the men, after the retreat had commenced, many shewed me their cartouch boxes, without a single cartridge in them, aud I know before they went into action each man was supplied with 60 rounds of cartridge.Wishing you every success in the completion of your arduous undertaking, i remain with the greatest regard and esteem,Your most obedient servant,ChAULKS CoTKSWOliTil PlNCKNEY.*Hon. Judgk Johnson’.I vill presume that the reader of this article has perused Colonel Pickering’s letter in your number of the 1 i3*h of October last, and if s he muat have bet-n struck with the fact that the address of that letter is not published ; but, although tlie name of the propounder of the queries to Colonel Pickering, does not appear, thlt;* tenor of those queries sufficiently identifies him with that class of controversialists who appear resolved to maintain that Washington lost the battle of Germantown by an egregious blunder, ^nd that Greene did not support him with promptitude. This latter purpose is distinctly indicated by the tenor of the fifth of those queries, the object of which is to determine when Greene came into action ; a circumstance altogether immaterial to the controversy respectit’g Washington and Pulaski. The candid and exculpating reply of Colonel Picker ing, howrver, has wholly baffled the malice nhich lurked beneath this inquiry : and yet Colonel Pickering has not adverted to the whole influence which distance had upon the time when Greeae’s column came into action. For, besides the circuitous route he had to pursue,the oblique position in which the enemy * as drawn upk with reference to the vidage and the two roads which led to it, placed the extremity of the wing which Greene encountered^ full mil* beyond that which the American right, under hullivan, had to cope with, where General Washington was in person.And I will now distinctly show that the purposes of the querist, with regard to Gen. Washington, are equally baffhd. and nothing gained as to Pulask’.iTiic. it r\ f\ 4 a ka o v u rti i nn/4 t ii t» U of K f h x*van beyond the house j to this fact Gen. Pinckney’s testimony is conclusive, and it is corroborated by all cotemporary accounts. Whereas, by Col. Pickering’* letter, it appears that his advice was given after he had returned from desiring Sullivan not to waste his fire ; an order which he was despatched to deliver some time after Sullivan bad passed on beyond the house.The conclusion is, lhat Col. Pickering did give the advice, not supposing that it could have occurred to the General, and beeu acted up*,npreviously 5 and the General did listen to it, because he could not avoid it. or did not notice it, or perhaps was too polite to say, “ Sir, I can command an Army, I hope.”With all th* se who wish to fasten on General Was hiugton the imputation of having lost the battle of Germantown by a blunder, it is an important prelude to establish that the surprise on that occasion was complete. With this, the fate of the day was certain ; wiriiout it, the success of the enterprise must still have depended on the fortune of a battle.Accordingly, we see here, that the second inquiry submitted to Col. Pickering has for its ob-ject to establish this great desideratum. The Cotorwel’s answer is not very precise or decisive,but the substance of it is, that, although the enemy were not actually caught asleep, yet it was a surprise, because they left their baggage behindthem.Now, when it is considered that the encampment of the armv was about two miles distant from the place where the baggage was left, that the American right, which drove the enemy from their baggage and (he might have added) (rum their tents, never got within a mile of that encampment, and in fact* until they had passed Chew’n house, never had to deal with more than a picket or picket guard, who carry little or no baggage, one may be inclined to doubt the logical strength of the Colonel’* conclusion.But the question does not r£at on argument or conjecture.* It is true, that General Washington, when he wrote his dispatches, had an id^a that the surprise was complete, but it was, as Gordon asserts, because he supposed, had it been otherwise, the enemy would have advanced beyond the village to meet him. And the American officers who *aw the tents of the pickets standing, supposed the same thing ; but in a uight attack, the safety of the baggage was a min r consideration, and, situated as the enemy were, with four or five roads leading upon them, two of which turned their flanks, it would have a folly to advance from their encampment, until the main attack of our army could be distinguish* ed from the feints which were made on the two roads, called Y ork and the itiu^e read, which led to then rear. When that pouit was ascertained, they could and did advance with confidence, $nd did form so as to cover the village, or the two roads by which the American coluftms were ad*ranting.Col. Pickeringsays thut they did not form under cover of the House, as 1 have related in rnv
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Washington National Intelligencer
Washington, Washington-DC, US
Mon, Dec 04, 1826
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USA 05 May 2020
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