ruau.o-iinviiu s anu ijoru inruns: 8 divisionswere ordered to march up the Brandywine to attack them in case they should cross, and some light-horse Were despatched above the Forks of the Brandywine to see if they actually had there crossed, and they, when they returned, brought iiformation that there was no appearance of the enemy in that quarter, which induced the General to suppose that the movement of the enemy was a feint, and that they were returning to reinforce Koyphausen, at Chad’s Ford. This uncertainty was at length removed, and authenticintelligence was brought, between three and four o’clock in the afternoon. that the enemy wereton, are equally bffhd. and nothing gained as toPuUsk*.The question to be examined is, whether the battle of Germantown was lost by a voluntary halt before Chew’s house ? I have maintained that whatever delay took place at that p*int, was very brief and unavoidable ; that it grew out rti an unexpected event, and was necessarily consequent upon that event ; that the uiomeuc the nature of it, and its bearing upon the issus of the day could be determined, it was provided against with promptness and judgment. i'o this view of the subject General Pinckney’s letter is full and conclusive. The halt of ^uUivan's division was without orders—a momentary check, produced by an unexpected fire from a post where no enrmy was looked for—immediately an Aid is expedited to receive the General’s order, and by the time that Aid could address himself to the Commander in-Chirf, Sullivan’s column is commanded to advance, and a regiment ported to hold in ch»-.tk the party io the hoii'C.Does Col. Pickering** letter, in any thing, impugn the testimony of Gen. Pinckney’s letter ?lit* tuu*t he dull indeed, or wdfuily blind, whodoes not perceive that it is even more exculpatory and yet perfectly consistent with it. These gentlemen obviously testify as to* different points of time, the one h» fore, the other after, bnllivanL passing Chew’s house, ami to die halt of differ*nt bodies id men—General Pinck ey as to the riiiht wing, under Sullivan, Colonel Pickering as to the reserve, under Lord Stirling. Concerning the first, General Pinckney lt;ays it was without orders and immediately remedied; Colonel Pick-# *, 9erirg asserts that it did not take pbee at all ;and, surely, stronger confirmation of Gen. Pinckney’s exculpation uf Washington could not be required.Colonel Pickering, in his answer to the 4 h query, expressly confines the halt to what he ter ms “ the rear dm»mn,M and which all the world knows must mean the reserve under Lord Stirling. Now, that a reserve should not b* brought into action for hall an hour after the main attack, is surely cm wonderful incident. From its relations to the rest of the army, it might be wanted to the left, to ihe nghr, lo the centre, ac-c rdu g to the tide of success, ami a. halt was indispensable to awaiting the course of event*.'V then, does Colonel Pickering’* u stirnony amount to but this—that, while the reserve wash:tited, fheir artillery played upon Chew’s house ; that a ft;ig '■ vas sent, anil military discussion took place, to which the military acumen of the Colonel, obviously had the belter of all pn*int. A fact, how ov* r, concerning which, he has been mostegregiousiy ui treated, since the very advice about (he castle, which it now appears was givenby Colonel Pickering, i- attributed by Gordon to the late Governor Meed, of Pennsylvania, (2 vol. p. 523.) Nor does the SM«e historian, although he wrote so soon after these events occurred, even admit Colonel Pickering into consultation on tnat octasion. It I have been guilty of a like cnmfefojon, I can only apologise bv observ in« thatI was not them av.are how much the service had suffered, because the mea*uies uf that day had nut been governed by the counsels of the Adjutant Gen* ral, and because toy erroneous notions of military etiquette inducedme to believe, that advice from an inferior officer would not have been given unless asked ; or, If given, would not have been divulged, much less have been brought into comparison with the les happily fir promptly conceived measures of the Commander-in-Chief.As to that part of the Colonel’s advice which is detail* d in Ids fourth answer, relative to posting a regiment at Chew’s House, that obviously must have come a day after the affair ; since the posting of Col. Ogden’s regiment for that purpose was simultaneous with the advance of Sulli-crossing in force at Jones’s Ford, about four mileshigher up the Brandywine than Chad’s. Sullivan’s, Lord Stirling’s, and Stevens’ divisions were ordered to oppose them. When Sullivan’s division were about to display on tbe ground above Birmingham Court Ifouse, it was found Lord Stirling5* division would be on the right of Sullivan’s, and it is said the latter division was $o tenacious of etiquette that it insisted to take the right, and, w hile it was countermarching for that purpose, it was attacked by Lord Cornwallis, and, after being thrown into disorder, dispersed. Greene’s division had b*en ordered to support our rilt;|ht, anil, while VVheedon’s brigade were marching over a ploughed field, Sullivan prnpos cd to the General to halt it there, and to dis; lav and take the enemy in Sank as they came down. This General Washington acceded to, and i was -s^^tiUrected to carry the orders, and then to go to Muhlenburgh’s brigade, (also a part of Greene’s division,) and order him ar the same time to attack the enemy in front. Both these manoeuvre s were performed critically, and Stewart’s Pennsylvania regiment and Stevens’, which formed part of Muhlenburgh’s brigade, in Greene’s division, behaved most gallantly, checked the advance of ^he enemy, and covered the retreat.Previous to the battle of Germantown, every measuie was taken to prevent the enemy from supposing a serious attack was aseditated ; their patrols were regulatly driven in, and their pickets assaulted by the light infantry and cavalry for three or four nights previous to the attack. This was done, too, on the night immediately preceding the attack, but aite*- having been done,Pulaski,who commanded the cavalry,unfortunately drew it off, and when thehn.d of Sullivan’s division arrived near the point cf attack, we fiuind ho had lain down and gone to sleep, for which lie was very severely reprimanded by the Genera!. Conway’s brigade, which led suHivau’s division, again drove in the enemy’s picket, and Sullivan, who then commanded the right wing, displayed his own division on the right of the road, and Wayne’s division on the left. (Wayne though a Brigadier, then commanded a division as weli a» at Brandywine, the division which was Lincoln’*,ho was then with the Northern army ) ThvBritish Light Infantry, under th ). Maitland, and six companies of the 40th regiment, under Coh Murgrave, who were posted at the head of Germantown. ntnr a mite in advance of Chew’s house,were then attacked and driven in, and M us-grave in his letreat took possession of Cliew** house, and threw the men of the 40lh that remaincd, into it.; he commenced a bri hant and incessant firing from the window*, without being able to see vny dearly what he find at, for the fog wa^ very thick and kept the smoke down so low that the battle was fought without the adverse jjarties scarcely setting each other, and the only way we knew of the enemy's being drawn up in opposition to us was by their fire and whistling of their balls, and it was sometime after they retreated, before we kiK \v of it, and that only by our nut hearing the whistling of their balls, and seeing no flashes in our front. At Chew’s house iht men unfortunately halted, and when one of the French Engineers mtiitiuned to me and requested I would stale it to the General, that he remembered such u thing’s ot curring in Italy, but the aiinv patted cn and gained flic victory, *nd tbe Cas-vancmg.ICol. Pickeringsays that they did not form under cover of the House, as 1 have related in my sketches. Let the facts related by himself decide the question. Sullivan was warmly engaged a little in advance of Chew’s house, between that and the village. With what troops was he engaged r Not with the British line at their encampment a mile off. but with the troops advanced and farmed across the main road, at the head of the village, under cover of Chew’s house. Geo. Washington supposed that he was throwing awayhis fire, but this was because the darkness of the morning prevented him from seeing the new position that the enemy had taken ; and neither could Col. Pickering perceive it, for the same cau*e. ihe sketch of the battle,drawn up and published j by the Adjutant General of the British a^tny, points out the line on which it was drawn up, af-ter advancing from its encampment; arid the re sisiance felt by both brigade's of Sullivaq’s division, establishes the correctness of the British drafts of the battle.It is astonishing to me that any mind can refuse its assent to the reasonableness uf the principle upon which I have attempted in the sketches ro reconcile the British and American accounts ot (his battle, and to assign the proper causes to effects which Iht* American army had so severelyexperienced. That principle, the North American Reviewers have thought it not unbecoming them altogether to mLrepreseof. I will endeavor lo make myself understood bv those who are willing to understand me. Other® are welcome to enjoy the impositions they tan practice upon those who will not read and think for themselves.It is an incontestable fact, that the two armieswere invisible to each other during the battleNeither, then, could discover the other’s move meats, but each must have beeu acquainted with his own. I take, then, the accounts of each as true, with regard to his own movements, and reject the conflicting accounts of the enemy ; the opposite account , will suit exactly when thus explained. The same principle is * q ally applicable a» to the intelligence under which either acted j and with what shew ol reason can we contradict the British account?* when they assert tnat they got intelligence of our advance by their patrols at 3 o’clock in the morning ? They were prepared to meet us, that we knew; and are we to disbelieve them because they did mt advance to meet us as expected at Chesnut Hill, or elsewhere • especially when they had such good rea-* jn» for acting ulherwise ? Or are we to discredit their official account uf having received such intelligence, because they did not choose to embar rass trieir movement** by striking tents or re nov-ing baggage which they felt themselves secure ofdefending, or recovering when the onemy should be repulsed ?It is ridiculous to reject the positive assertion ut the British commandertin-chief, that he did recerie such intelligence, upon the ground of his unwillingness to acknowledge himself surprised. Weicthey not underarms? Did they uot ad vauce their ielt a mile from their camp, take a new position, and succeed in repulsing us ? VV hat evidence, then, have we to excite a doubt as to the tact of having discovered our advance ? Weshould rather lay hold of the apology which itpre-seats tor our failure.The question put to Col. Pickering respecting Count Pulaski, ranks first in order, but 1 defer it to the last, both bvciuse it presents the least difficulty, and because I attach to it the least importance. I care not whether it is believed or not. i nave shewn that I believed it, and had good grounds for believing it ; and that it was j a fact necessary to explain how, notwithstandingi A I 1 A L. . lt;a ■ « . . ■ •T the te nturn«atJSKxt\ny (cetli\cmTruncv0to u t . tli*arBltOi:x\\SUO'Ubtfetactilitor ;CJUw*ntnclExtIIan.the!sonS-;VOlresonlt;forwe*ofatofCialt;cj ali the precautions ot General Washington, his |t;s1 Ut ong.ua) ot this letter has been seen by Chief«us1kc Ma*and other Judges cf the Suprcnre Cuu.t,at.m iS i:i rrtv1 i lie Annual Cetpsier for 1773, p. 1J9, asserts posi- , | l‘lUl i; i* approach was comnjui.icated to them at |. 3 o*chn:k in the morning by tbeir patroles, and the army ' ctleu ? ’ « —-irnn;V* i » 4 4His, thereiure. no sarcrisa.