THE DAILY HERALD—CIRCLEVILLE, OHIOPRICEHIGHtPAYMENTBITTERBUT YANKS LEARNED LESSONSiEDITOR'S NOTE—In the bellefthat the soldier's own view of what he has learned in one year of war is of interest to the folk on the home front, the Central Press Association and this newspaper present the first of a seriesof three installments of Twelve Months Under Fire, a story that appeared in Yank, the Army weekly, and is reprinted by special permission.WHEN YANK’S first issue was circulated, June 18, 1942, America was doing its fighting exclusively on the. sea and in the sky. But in the year that has passed since Yank came into existence, Guadalcanal has been captured, New Guinea cleaned out, Australia freed from the threat of invasion, Africa freed from Axis domination. Pearl Harbor rebuilt and the submarine menace lessened in the Atlantic, and now a drive is under way to push the Japs out of the Aleutians. Soon will come the invasion Of Europe. ...During that year of war, American soldiers have had a good look at themselves as fighting men. They have had a chance to put the theories they learned during basic training into practice under fire. They have been able to test their weapons against the enemy.On these pages, Yank has rounded up from reports of its correspondents on every front the genera] reactions and conclusions of U. S. soldiers concerning their Army's progress in the last 12 months. These pages hold the mL lt;ror up to ourselves.A lot of lessons have beenSELF PROTECTION—Basic lesson learned in of e well-concealed foxhole for protectionthe Pacific is the value against snipers, planes.dn JRTOPS—That's how the Tommy gun when itAmerican soldiers fighting the Japs rate the comes to individual shooting in tho jungle.IL. ,meHir.cwtcchniauesend Iequipment developed that we still can t talk about. But here, in brief, is what can be told at this time.Fighting the JapsOur war against Japan was fought chiefly during the last year in the jungles of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. To our men, jungle warfare was new and strange. They soon discovered that throwing a hand grenade in a dense forest was a hell of a lot different from grenade practice on a parade ground. The men also had to learn the technique of working on their own in small scattered patrols where the natural inclination to bunch up in twos or three was a fatal error Each roldier had to do his own thinking and he had to have enough patience to lie motionless for hours.Many a soldier in Guadalcanaland New Guinea gladly would have paid $100 for a pair of silent rubber-soled sneakers like the Japs wore. They eventheir deg tags to prevent from jingling c.o patrol missions.Lessens wo learned about j .ngk'fighting:Our weapons have been awayfnthi/itapedtlnraahead of the oppo3itlon in combat except that we had nothing to equal the Jap “knee’* mortar, a handy 50-mm. portable one or two-man piece with which the enemy did a lot of damage. Our men like j the Tommy gun best for individual shooting and respect the Ml. I The men discovered at Guadalcanal that jungle warfare gave them little opportunity to use the ' rifle sling. Fast fire in volume wan often required. The target usually was obscured, and volume battle fire was most useful. Deluges of rain ruled out compliance with the “soap and water for three days cleaning rule. Men cleaned bore and chamber of their guns with soekn, shirtr. undershirts, even tore legs from trousers to get rags.Cover and concealment. Tkrc ihc;;p:rier.ce our men lerrnrd rot toneglect the basics of cafftouSaje. They wore green clothes, blocked faces for night work, in the absence of chemicals allow ad theirbeards to grow end learned byhard work to wall: quietly, although Jap priseneto caiddid not kern that lerccn \f r'T** t v ! * ^ ] f h ♦ f ^ h *14 v' « m ♦ * w 3JF • mo * Ai lw Ml % A m . * «, * •'W dMb* mcrft] slit trencher murt be dug \and concealed equally well. They also learned to keep off the trails even when jungle brush was matted, since Jap MG fire covering trails did not traverse.Infiltration and Diversion. Theenemy worked behind defensive positions to create confusion and to draw fire by simple but effective shouting, rock-throwing or feinting away from the main attack. Jap sniper fire proved disconcerting until it was evaluated for what it was—a not-too-eflfeetive nuisanco.On the offensive, artillery playedthe major part in softening up defensive positions, but the Jap usually doesn’t quit until an infantryman nails him.s learned not to wear_ _ Alit 31i HM * W jfIdentifying Insignia and not to allow their men to call to them by rtnl: or to leak at them for orders The Jap will pars up 20 enlisted men to get an cfRcer. In such a situation, o3*.cars had to prove thcmrslvca real leaders, and thosewho were not found themselves intfce rear. «Also, our reports from ’Cana!cay, you learn, after watching tcouple c; successful operation*, totrust and welcome support fromICONCEALMENT—Ono lesson taught by tho Nips was tho propor usa of camouflage clothing in tho junglo.artillery and air and coaatwiscnaval shelling. This is particularly true of artillery, w'hich worked tn close co-operation with infantry. You have to have plenty of faith in the accuracy of somebody else when he’s shooting at an enemy 100 yards away — the same faith William Tell’s little boy had.”Artillery In New GuineaIn New Guinea, on the otherhand, artillery played a very small part in the Buna and Sananandacampaigns. It was almost impossible to move heavy field pieces in that swampy terrain. The supply problem was terrific and malaria a constant menace. Over the Owen Stanley mountains the men fought the whole way in stealth and concealment, with little water and much dehydrated food. It was a long, tough haul.Target designation gave way in New Guinea to concentrated fire power in the general direction of an enemy who did not show himself. Every morning trees were sprayed top to bottom to catch snipers and, in the absence of heavy artillery, 81-mm. mortars disrupted enemy supply lines, particularly parachuted supplies.On the march, such pack essentials as shelter halves, raincoats and mess kits became nonessentials and, along with gas masks,were left in the rear to be brought up by reinforcements. Stripped down to necessities, infantry equipment contained a canteen, sun helmet. fatigue cap, gun, ammunition bandoleers and a little food. Even blankets were torn in half to lighten the load.Use of five and eight-man squadswas sometimes moderated owing to density of the jungle, w'hich prevented deployment in force. So thesoldier in New' Guinea, as at Guadalcanal, had to learn how to dohis owm thinking and his map and compass reading instead of depending upon an officer or noncom.Chewing gum. pin-up pictures, comic magazines and crunchy candy bars became mtmortftg to the men of New Guinea, and while there were sometimes cigarettes, it was hard to find a light. The fighting men had great respect for the QM jeep drivers, the medics andthe Fuzzy Wuzzy natives. They also had great respect for the rules for preventing malaria, and the guy who didn’t follow thosa rules was a chump and a very sick one,at that •*MENACE OF SWAMFS—Swampland In New Ouinea, withgoing plenty tough for^th# Yanks who have foughtIts accompanying throat of malaria, mads tho thsro, alongside tholr comrades,, tho ^ Aussie*.TOMORROW-Whot Yanks have learned in combat with Nasis.