the ground to another unit.“I looked up, and there were six or seven Germans/’ he said. “I hid/'During the battle, he was wounded and hospitalized and never returned to the front.Art G. Halldin, an Indiana publisher, was a teeh sergeant in the 99th Division’s 395th Regimental Combat team when the Germans attacked in the early hoars of Dec. 16. His unit was conducting an offensiveon German soil when suddenly the enemy pounded with tanks and artii-lery.The 106th Division, on the left, “was struck and almost completely wiped out/1 Halldin remembered. The 395th held its position around the towns of Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld until the night of Dec. 18, when it received a radio order to retreat to the out' posts near Elsenbom Ridge.“The men had it rough, sloshing through the snow and mud on foot,” said Halldin. “It was in the St. Vith area where the Germans captured a number of our men, lined them up and shot them.”Halldin's company continued its retreat toward Elsenbom and was continually pummeled by artillery and jet fighters. Halldin got a look at some of the early jet fighters as they strafed his unit along the way.As the commander of the 395th, Col. Alexander J. MacKenzie learned when arriving at regimental headquarters at Elsenbom that theradio order to retreat was false — faked bv the Germans.In “Battle Babies/' Gen. Walter E. Lauer, 99th Division commander, wrote that the withdrawal opened up the area around Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld, which thus “could have been rolled up by the enemy, who all that day had been attacking in every increasing strength from that very direction.”'Lauer learned about the mistake after seeing MacKenzie at the command post.• “I almost passed out,” Lauer wrote of his surprise. “Failure to turn the regiment meant disaster.”He ordered the regiment to turn and fight.