The Mitchell Case. We stated a few days since that, in the case of Mitchell verses Mitchell, Judge Landon had rendered a decision in favor of Caleb W. Mitchell. We give the opinion: MITCHELL against Mironetti.—Lanion, J. The shift of voluntary conveyance by a principal to his agent of the subject of his agency, raises the presumption of fraud and undue influence, al though these are not visible to the eye; and the burden is cast upon the agent to establish the fact that the transaction is free from both of these vices, and, failing to do this, he must ac count for the gift to his agent or those who rep resent him. The authorities in support of these propositions are very numerous. The convey ance to the agent's wife, at his request, is treated the same as to the agent himself. (Davone vs. Fanning, 2 John Ch. 252, Lingke vs. Wilkinson, B7.N. ¥. 445, 451.) . It is undisputed that Caleb W. Mitchell was originally the owner of the Glen Mitchell prop erty, and of an undivided half of the Saratoga Springs property. These he conveyed to George F. Mitchell in 1869. There is undisputed evi dence to the effect that this conveyance was in trust for the use of Caleb, and to reconvey at his request, and I have no doubt that such was the fact. The same conveyance, however, to Caleb’s wife, included the undivided half of the Saratoga Springs premises, and the question to be considered is whether upon the whole case the presumption of fraud and undue influence arising from the fact of the existence of the agency is overcome. «At the time of this conveyance George H. Mitchell was about 30 years of age. He was never married. He and his brother Caleb had always been much together, and upon intimate and friendly terms. He was an active and in telligent man, and in good health. After this conveyance, and up to the time of his death, George lived most of the time at Saratoga. On one occasion he aided Caleb in procuring a loan upon these premises upon a mortgage executed by Caleb's wife. Onother occasions he stated to intending purchasers that Caleb’s wife was the owner of the premises. He executed the deed in pursuance of a purpose expressed a few days before the deed was drawn. The deed was read to him by the draftsman, and a state ment made of the property it covered, and he said it was all right. Of course he had the legal right to do with his property as he pleased. I am inclined to think that the presumption raised by the law upon grounds of public policy, and which is not in the least supported by any evi dence of imposition or unfairness, ought not to prevail over the presumption that an intelligent and active business man, having a full opportunity to know all the facts, and to estimate their effects before he made the deed, and who had the purpose to do that act, for several days before he did it, and who after he did it exerted himself to enable his grantee to realize the benefit of the grant, who to all outward appearance so long as he lived acquiesced in what he had done, did what he did do deliberately, and with the full knowledge of all the facts, and in no wise prejudiced by the fact that the relation of principal and agent existed between him and his brother. In fact when this deed was made he occupied the van tager ground. He not only had title to his own, but to his brother's property as well, and he was in a condition to dictate the terms necessary for his protection. He was not selling his property, so that any suspicion or imposition as to the inadequacy of the price can be entertained, but he parted with it without price, and he knew it was valuable property. Like every sestué que trust, he had the right to appeal to the protec tion of the court, but he did not, and now that his heirs invoke the remedy devised for the protection of the weak and exposed, it seems proper to remind them that he was strong and well protected, and to answer in the language of Daly, J., in Clark vs. Law. (22 Hon. 420,) “The cessus que trusé was not of that class over whom a court of equity watches with such vigilant guardianship as net to permit them to dispose of their own.”* The complaint must be dismissed, but with out costs, Defendant's counsel will submit find ings and order to that effect.