Hide Article Text (OCR)
Sfaigs mxij iljeir |lcm«bics.NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.Invitation to Premises—Danger—Knowledge op Negligence.—The plaintiff went witha cart and team, by implied invitation, to fetch lime from the defendants’ railway yard. While in the yard he unharnessed a mare that was leading his team. A passing train frightened the mare ; she backed some considerable distance, and, in spite of the plaintiff’s efforts to hold her, fell over a dwarf wall of the defendants’, and was hurt. An action having been brought in the Comity Court by the plaintiff against the defendants, for not having a sufficient fence to the yard, it was proved at the trial that the plaintiff knew the place well, and had been there often before. The County Court judge found that the fence was insufficient, and decided in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal: Held, that there was no proof of want of reasonable care on the part of the defendants to prevent damage from unusualdanger to persons visiting the premises with full knowledge of the state of the place, and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover:(TheManchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company (apps.) v. Woodcock (resp.), 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 335. Q.B.)NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.Right of Ship’s Agent to sue for Necessaries.—The agents of a foreign ship in a British port, who have paid for necessaries supplied to her, or who have rendered themselves liable to pay for such necessaries, may sue the ship for sneli advances as were made on the ship’s account, but not for the balance of a general account against her owners. A co-partner in a ship may sue the ship for such advances made by him, but, semhle, not if the co-partner is interested in the particular voyage for which the ship is supplied. The West Friesland (Swa. 455) followed: (The Underwriter, 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 279. _ Adm.)WOOLWICH COUNTY COURT.Thursday, Nov. 2.(Before Pitt Taylor, Esq., Q. C., Judge.)Crout v. Haslett.Admiralty jurisdiction—Concurrent jurisdiction at common laiu—The Act of 1868—Everard v. Kendall—“ Ships”A County Court not hawing Admiralty jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to entertain any of the causes enumerated as “ Admiralty causes” in the Act of 1868 (ss. 3 4* 5) if the cause of action arose within the district of a court having such jurisdiction.Held further, in opposition to dicta of the judges in Everard r. Kendall, that a County Court ho oin g A dmiralty juris die tio n has j urisdiction overall cases of collision, and might, therefore, entertain a cause instituted byaroiv-boat against a yacht.The Malvina and other cases considered.In this case his Honour delivered the following judgmentThis is an action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an injury caused to his boat by a collision with the defendant’s yacht. The accident occurred on the Thames, within the district of this court if the cause can be tried at common law—within the district of the City of London Court if the cause be an Admiralty cause. I purposely make use of this alternative language because, although I am aware that a different opinion prevails in some quarters, I am myself satisfied that a concurrent jurisdiction cannot be recognised by law in this matter. I am not now alluding to the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts of law, but simply to the powers vested in the County Courts ; and I am guided and controlled in my judgment by the express language of the Legislature. On turning to the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 1868 (31 32Viet. c. 71), I find in sec^ 5 that, as soon as a County Court is appointed to have Admiralty jurisdiction within any district, “ no County Court other than the County Court so appointed shall have jurisdiction within that district in any Admiralty cause,” and the term “ Admiralty cause” is defined by sect. 3 as including all the causes enumerated therein. If, then, this particular cause be one embraced in that category, cedit questio; this court has no power to interfere. The above language appears to me so plain that it does not require to be fortified by any reference to the absurdities which might arise were a contrary law to prevail; but still it may be well to bear in mind what an unseemly spectacle of justice would be exhibited if, in a case of collision, cross-actions could be brought in two different courts, governed by different rules, ana constituted in different ways, the one judge assisted bytwo nautical assessors, the other attempting to guide a jury of five landsmen in accordance with his unaided instincts. Having thus shortly stated the grounds on which I decide that County Courts which^ have, and those which have not, Admiralty jurisdiction cannot exercise concurrent authority over the same classes of cases, I come to the more important question, whether the City of London Court has jurisdiction over the cause before me. This depends on the meaning of the words “ any claim for damage by collision,” which will be found in the 3rd section of the Act, as constituting the subject matter of one of the Admiralty causes therein mentioned. Now, these words are capable of receiving at least four different interpretations. First, they may be confined to collisions between two ships ; secondly, they may include the case of a ship damaged by a boat; thirdly, they may include the case of a boat damaged by a ship ; and fourthly, they may include the case of a collision between two boats. At one time an attempt was made to give them the last and widest interpretation, and a County Court judge with Admiralty jurisdiction was invited to try a cause where the litigants were the respective owners of two dumb barges—that is, barges solely propelled by oars—which had run into each other on the Thames. A prohibition, however, was granted by the Court of Common Pleas, on the ground that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the County Court over cases of collision, was certainly not larger than that of the High Court of Admiralty, and that that court had no power to deal with a collision which should happen within the body of a county between two dumb barges, such barges being neither “ ships ” nor “ sea-going vessels” within the meaning of the 6th section of the Admiralty Act of 1840 (3 4 Viet. c. 65): Everard v. Kendall (5 L. Rep., C. P., 428.) This decision was doubtless right; but, unfortunately, the learned j udges, not content with simply disposing of the question before them, were tempted to express more or less strong opinions that the “ collision ” mentioned in the Act of 1868 meant “ a collision between two ships.” Opinions coming from such a quarter, though technically they amount to mere obiter dicta, are, of course, entitled to great weight, especially when they are brought under the notice of an inferior tribunal; but still they have no binding authority. I trust I shall avoid the charge of presumption if I venture, on grounds which I shall presently mention to question their correctness in this instance. The statute was passed to confer on certain County Courts Admiralty jurisdiction, and the language employed in it ought, in my judgment, to be interpreted as it would be were it found in any Act relating to the High Court of Admiralty. Then, if this be a sound canon of construction, the word “ collision,” as used in the 3rd section of the Act of 1868, must mean any collision which the High Court of Admiralty would have power to investigate. Thus far the learned judges would probably agree with me, for they actually did decide that the term could not have a wider interpretation in the County Court than in the Superior Court, and one cannot easily imagine any intelligible reason why it should be held to have a narrower interpretation. But the error, ^ if I may use the expression, into which the judges appear to have fallen, has arisen from a misapprehension respecting the real limits of Admiralty jurisdiction. Such a question is one with which common law judges are not necessarily familiar. In the case under discussion, the legal arguments were not of a high order of merit. Several of the leading authorities were not alluded to at all, and those cited were calculated to mislead. For instance, the case of the Bilboa (Lush. Adm, Rep. 152) was quoted to prove that the Admiralty Act of 1840, by sect. 6, did not give the Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over damage done by a ship to a barge within the body of a county, the words of that section simply applying to “ damage received by any ship or sea-going vessel.” This was true enough, but the inference which the court was left to draw from the case—viz., that the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court continued thus limited in 1808—was altogether illusory. The facts were these : The case of the Bilboa was decided in 1860, and in the following year an Act was passed (24 Viet c. JO, to extend the Admiralty jurisdiction, the effect of which was entirely to neutralise the authority of that case. Sect. 7 of the Act is in these words : “ The High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done by any ship.” This Act came into operation on the 1st June 1861, and in the year 1862 an opportunity arose for putting a legal construction on the language just cited. The Malvina, a screw steamer, contrived to sink the Mystery, a barge laden with sugar, in the Blackwall Reach, and a suit in the Admiralty Court was the consequence. Thereupon the defendant put in a plea that the barge was not a ship or sea-going vessel, and that the collision took place within the body of a county; but this plea was rejected by Dr. Lushington. On appeal to the Privy Council the judgment was affirmed Lord
Newspaper Details
County Courts Chronicle
London, Middlesex, GB
Fri, Dec 01, 1871
Page 21
Full Page
Clipped by
Richard B.
GB 14 Feb 2023
Other Publications Near London, Middlesex
Bingleys Journal
Arminian Magazine
London Daily Mail
London Stars and Stripes
London Daily Universal Register
