sdickf Cub Clem-e par* lcsday cubs meet-i wasMatter Of FactBy STEWART ALSOPPeiSpLi]mlttt-e who . Pack ffcicd Is was he en-' Mis.3 and \ com-it for scout d th.o ir, Al. cl the:omers :ccl as with cs tho t, Bob-liCCl 1o 3: Tim , Rob-accvlc, Funk, ss, Ar-Ball let, Pisher, [urtlni-An End To Operation Paperclip”WashingtonSecretory of Defense George Marshall and Undersecretary Robert Lovett are now engaged In the Heiculean task of trying to 1 save a full $15 billion a yem in defense expenditures. The Marshall-Lovett goal Is to ieduce the level of defense spending from the colossal* $55 billion a year currently projected to $40 billion and perhaps loss. .This is economy, and with a vengeance But it Is economy of a very different sort from the economy'’ of the unlamented Louis Johnson. The difference is really very simple. The Johnson piogram was based on the delusion that any substantial Increase in milltaiy expenditures would almost instantly cause the American economic structure to come apart like the one-hossshny. Thus the whole emphasis in Ihc defense department was on holding upending to the arbitrary Johnson limit, rather than on providing the combat potential needed for suivival.Lovett and Marshall, by contrast, have now put the horse in front of the cait. They have asked first wlmt combat power the United States must have They have accepted the answer — a 20-divlsion army, an air foice expanded as rapidly as possible towaid 90 groups, a navy In a state of war readiness, with a much more powerful air arm and marine force. Only when this was established did the Marshall-Lovctt team take a good, hard look at! the price in men and money. And as a result of this good Hard look, they have demanded that the same combat power be delivered with substantially fewer men and $15 billion less in money.Tho fact Is that the Johnson program, because il was based on a delusion, Induced a sort cf neurosis In the military. Every respon-slblc military planner was perfectly aware, long before Korea, that tho combat powei of the United States was totally inadequate in view cf the world situation. But the Idea that the economic survivalApj dlvldt the comp outh with ice e AIv retarcomn vestlj wilt ! pub! I Coi secki rural chani scrib Plym fromMithe United States was at stake had been so- drilled Into thorniml nr-to six e with sc ad-ments. resent-- Wll-'homas ViUlam Weber, award*of the ik and is, tin-Ar den . was the re-f those living. tie Inti*/’ all i done ce,of the lcid on m was in plainions— The short-orr.Tr.ls-al of flit an.thal'even after Korea, tho first estimate of requirements was heldto $18 billion. ,II was not until about the beginning of August that the military chiefs suddenly woke up to the fact that money was no longer tho flist cor.sldeiation Then the r.eurosis began, as it were, to work In lcvcisc. It was then that whal has slr.ee become kr.own as Opeiatlon Paperclip began. Every conceivable pet project, which had hitherto been no more than a gleam in some frustrated general officer’s eye, was Hastily unearthed, dusted off, and approved Lost estimates mounted as if jet-propelled, to the $55 billion-a-yeor level, lo support a military establishment of over 3,000,000 men.Now Marshall.and Lovctl have demanded an end to 'Operation Paperclip and a completely new start. The nature of the problem which confronts them is illustiated by the row now smouldering between tho air force and tho army. As the aimy is r.ow organized, a 20-divlsion ground force would mean an army of about a million and a half men, or half the contemplated total force. And because the army, which has been living on Its Woild War II fat, must be re-enulppcd almost liom scratch, this in turn would moan that*the army would take upwaids of half the Marshull-Lovett $40 billionbUd With the navy taking its share of the remainder, this would leave neither enough money nor enough men for a rapid builc.up towards an air force of at len9t 90 groups, which all authorities agree Is now essential to American security. Moreover, air force men angilly assort, duiing the period of mounting clanger which confronts the Westein alliance, the Kremlin, with a mobilization potential of 300 divisions, is not going to be detoned from adven-Hues by a 20division American army. The Kremlin will be dcteired, if at all, by crushing American strategic nlr superiority.The answer is suggested by a single set ot figures. The Red atmy’s divisional slice-the number of men in unifoim required lo maintain- a single Russian division in the field—is 22,000 men at war strength, The comparable American figure is well over .0,000 men The same conttast applies equally, if not moie, in the case of the air foiee and the navy.Obviously the answer is that all three services must deliver much more actual fighting power per man committed and per dollar spent. This is picclsely the answei which Marshall and Lovett are now sternly demanding And because they have considered first, the job which must be done, and only second, the men and dollars required to do the pob, the answer they arc demanding lepresents true, rather than false, economyYet one thing more needs to be said. With Communist China now apparently wholly committed in Korea, any fool can see that a third world war lS'at least possible. Ar.d any fool can also see that Ihc Ameiican armed forces must have at all costs the wherewithal to fight, and eventually to win such a war. Everything else, even hue economy, must be suboidinated lo this(Copyright, 1950, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.)Mi ton Milw sana wher Sh was sana a cai waulWar