Washington WindowCarter, B-l and the Pittsburg dilemmaBy ARNOLD SAWISLAK WASHINGTON (UPI) — In 1936, as Franklin D. Roosevelt was planning his second campaign, someone pointed out that the president was scheduled to speak in Pittsburgh, where four years earlier he had pledged to balance the federal budget if elected.According to the story, FDR asked Ben Cohfen, one of his “braintrust,” how the problem should be handled inasmuch as the first Roosevelt administration had not quite produced a balanced budget.“Deny you were ever in Pitt-sburgrff’ Cohen supposedly replied. tJhat anecdote has become a kind of centerpiece of commentary on campaign promises ^ Another comment often quoted is “The purpose of campaign promises is to get elected.”7 So there has grown up, probably for good reason, massive cynicism about the promises politicians make while seeking election.Even so, special interest groups continue to seek promises from candidates during campaigns. Business wants the officeseeker tospeak up for investment tax credits; labor wants a promise of higher minimum wages; feminists demand support of ERA; Catholic churchmen want a pledge of opposition to abortion.The candidate can try to promise, everything to everybody, but that can make trouble if the media is listening. And if the candidate declines to make any promises, the opposition is sure to charge that the issues are being dodged.Which brings us to the B1 bomber. Jimmy Carter opposed building it in a statement to the Democratic national convention platform committee in June of 1976. But hardly a month later, Carter told reporters he favored continuation of research and development on Bl, but .not production. That is pretty much the position he stuck to * through the general election campaign.That probably was an ideal campaign promise, a perfect straddle. It opposed building the Bl but not working on it. It satisfied the bomber's critics and neutralized most of its supporters, who would be disposed to be silent for fear ofjeopardizing the weapon's remaining chances.But, of course, the day of reckoning eventually arrived. Carter the president had to make the real world decision on the issue that was so much easier for Carter the candidate.His decision was no change — research but no production unless world conditions required it. By offering the cruise missile as the better option for the Bl, Carter was able to utilize a difference of opinion in the military-defense complex to insulate himself against charges of disregarding national security needs.The Lighter SideMuscleThe irony ?h$re was that Carter didn't grasp the opportunity to trumpet tjiat^ He^had redeemed a campaign promise. In fact, the president said, he had tried very hard to disregard his previous positions — to “keep an open mind” — in reaching his decision.Which seems to leave campaign promises in the same low estate as before: even politicians who carry them out say it was only coincidental. In this case, the Ben Cohen advice to a president with a “Pittsburgh dilemma” probably would, be “Tell ‘em it’s great to be back in Philadelphia.”