Internet Payments

Secure & Reliable

Your data is encrypted and secure with us.
Godaddyseal image
VeraSafe Security Seal

Lethbridge Herald Newspaper Archives

- Page 13

Join us for 7 days to view your results

Enter your details to get started

or Login

What will you discover?

  • 108,666,265 Obituaries
  • 86,129,063 Archives
  • Birth & Marriages
  • Arrests & legal notices
  • And so much more
Issue Date:
Pages Available: 21

Search All United States newspapers

Research your ancestors and family tree, historical events, famous people and so much more!

Browse U.S. Newspaper Archives

googlemap

Select the state you are looking for from the map or the list below

OCR Text

Lethbridge Herald, The (Newspaper) - January 29, 1973, Lethbridge, Alberta Henry Kissinger: ...more than any other man Nixon's enigmatic confidante has shaped U.S. foreign policy January 29, 1973 THE LETH4RID6E HERALB J3 By ROBERT B. SE.MPLE JR. New York Times Service NEW YORK Whatever triumph and tragedy there is in the agree- ments between the contending parlies in Vietnam, they belong, ultimately and properly, to President Nixon and to the leaders in Ha.no: and Saigon. Nonetheless. very existence of an agreement is In no small measure. a tribute to the consistency, cunning and even conceit of Henry A. Kissin- ger, who believed from the begining that the war could and would end in a negotiated solution, who worked with- out pause to dense the subtleties of that solution ar.d whose lowering self- assurance enabled him to push for- wr.rd when others thought he must surely stumble. The agreement and (he JS-ypsr-o'd Kissinger's role in i: illuminuate. with- out necessarily concluding, ore of the more compelling pieces of theatre pro- cured by the Nixon the transform a ton of a relatively ob- scure theoretfdsn of diplomacy into the most influential of the president's advisers, the most acrobatic of his emissaries. Ihe most polished and persuasive of his public spokesmen and the most soughf afier dinner companion in Washington in short, a truly national figure who seemed in the words of Kissinger himself used to describe the isth century diplomat at home in the scion and in the cablet." There are some things about Kissin- ger that have been aid remain quiie apparent. There is EO mystery about the two principles that have covemed his professional conduct while serving Nixon. The first is his firm conviction that foreign policy, given (he exigencies of the nuclear age. must be centralized in the oval office of the White House and in the National Security Council, which Kissinger revamped, at Nixon's express instructions, to serve ihe oc- cuDant of that office. The second pnr.cir'e follows upon ihe first- tha: nothing be done to undermine ihe credibility and au- thority of (he president. Sviubiosis li must be left to ing one hopes, the president and his national seciri-y describe the carious sintikiosis beii-.-een ihrai. It seems clear even r.ow (hat their relalionship rests mere on profes- sional on instinctive companions hiD. Trusting Kissinger In a way that he trusts few other men. NLxon has con- ferred on him a degree of indepen- dence in both private anl public behavior that is not routinely granted to other subordinates. One re- sult familiar to those who have re- ported on the White House in recent years, is that Kissinger's briefings are livelier than most. His humor is the fed that contrives to be at once self-deprecating and self-important. "There cannot be a crisis next week.'1 he remarked on one occasion. schedule is already full." Kissinger's decision to sign on with the his subsequent of- firmations of the soundness of that de- cision continue to disconcert some people who cannot easily reconcile his background with his position. It seemed an :dd combination even at .he time. Kissinger a Harvard professor, and Harvard, then as now. was Jot exactly iestDor.ed with Nixon loyalists. Moreover, the smbiiious young professor's published works two books and some monographs oa I9th century diplomacy, plus a cele- brated work on strategic choices call- ed '-Nuclear weapons and foreign pol- icy1' constituted precisely tie right credentials to win admission to the select circle of "hard-nosed'' academ- ics who were frequently asked to ad- vise Presidents Eisenhower. Kennedy and Johnson. Kissinger served all three, but in positions far less authori- tative Jhan the one he occupies iodsy. In retrospect Niton's invitation to Kissinger to join his team was not nearly so odd as it seemed. An im- mediate point of departure was their joint conriction that the foreign policy machinery should be recast to coordi- nate the advice of the bureaucracy and consolidate policy makins in the White House. During the campaign Nixon had promised to revive the old National Security Council machinery; during the mterregum Kissinger de- signed the stnieture Nixon That structure still defies, precise descriptiou. but one statement can be made with impunity: Kissinger runs it all. He chairs most of the important interdepartmental panels that funnel the judgment and recommendations of the btrsaucracy to the oval office and. later, channel the president's in- tentions back to the departments and agencies. Kissinger also directs the Foreign Service officers, the coordi- nators and the policy and program analysts who are the elite corps of his personal staff. may be too soft a word to describe his managerial tech- nique. He dominates, rather, and he drives. Sixieen-hour days are not un- common, and senior men work almost every day of the week. Perfection is the desired standard. The Kissinger Nixon post Viet- nam vision included a new relation- ship v.ith China As early as 1967. in an essay in the magazine foreign af- iairs Nixon had spoken of his hope bringing !be Chinese Communists back into the world family. On Nixon's 12th day in office he sent a note to his national security adviser asking him to explore every means of cultivating better relations. Kissinger readily undertook the task, and from that and his efforts flowed the president's exploratory trip to Ru- mania, Kissinger's secret ventures to Peking and. finally. Nixon's dramatic meetings with Mao Tse-Tung and Choa En-Lai in February, 1972. Slil] a-iHther point uas the belief shared by the president and his ad- viser that if the war m Vietnam was to be liquidated, it ought to be done in a way that enhanced rather than threatened the opportunity to build a new structure of peace that both men sensed was at hand. Domestic considerations foreclosed escalation of the war or even main- tenance of inherited levels. At the same time, however, unilateral with- draw al would, Kissinger argued weaken this country's honor and crip- ple its power to bargain with its allies or. more important, its cold-war ene- mies. Finally, the president and his ad- viser persuaded themselves that not only .American credibility overseas but also the stability of .American so- ciety depended in on small meas'jre on the manner in which a war that required a staggering investment in men and money was brought to a close. Kissinger, no less than Nixon, sought an end-Ing that could be ac- cepted as redeeming the sacrifice. 'The big intangible." he said, at a White House briefing in December, IKS. "is not only whether there will be public acceptance of the war but alsrj whether there will be pubic ac- ceptance of the peace. Anybody can end the war. Our problem is to keep the society together. We are not trying to create more schisms. We are trying to heal the schisms through the pro- cess of how we ere trying to end the war" Although Kissinger met often with his critics on the stu- dents, academic delegations, protni- VIETCONG TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM m and sbductons JJSS of 1966. Source: U.S Defense Department) 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Tolzlj. 29.795 people jsiassmalBt abducted VIETNAM PEOPLE STATISTICS CIVniAN CASUALTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM of fifurtl, wtiich in tstK nuti: Ui Swili Suloinirint, RerjfKS and Ejuptcj) 0 Wounded si M f i I i i '61 '64 '67 70 '72 flJST JyJ. noinijible 00.1 f MfiJQI UW POPULATION DENSITY IN INDOCHINA (in 1968) 0 Miles If-J cent sessions did not him to reduce ihe American comioiLiTjeru more rapidly or to de- from his pursuit of a negotiated seitlerr-c-nt. Thoughts Some of thoughts were set forth by Kissinger in an extraordinary background session for newspaper ex- ecutives in San Clemente. Caiif., in June. 1970: "What we have to do really. us. is to preserve some vestige of in this country if we are ever going to move with confidence and competence toward a better fu- ture. "If confidence in the president and in all -nstltutions is systematically de- stroyed. v.ii] iurr; a group tha! has nothing left bjt a physical K strength, and the only outcome of this is csBsaristn. The people shout 'power to the people' are not gr-L-.; to be the people who wiil tal-te over this co-jnoy L' it turns into a test of strength. Upper-middle-class coiiff e K.is v.lll no; take this coioiry over. Some more primitive and mental force v.-il] do that if it hap- pens. WAR COST AMERICANS BILLION A YEAR B> L. DALE JR- New York Times Service WASHINGTON Although the bud- peiary cosi o: the TTET in Vietnam his already bee- reduced drasdcally along mtb the dec'-iae in troop levels, a nonetheless produce use.ul savings in s fecrrsl budge: thai is under strain. The pfrlce cf and bud- g e; :hit the the of Xorri. Vietnam- ese and naval ac'.ivity v.'y costing about mosris, or 52 billion s This in to the ihoiich recuce-f. cortinuhg costs o; ivhich bem-een 53 and S4 billion in the current fiscal year. Most of those shouid taper oif a_DJ dis- sppesr. There vv-ss no cificial ''before- arc-afrer" of defense speeding the savings in the azTKt fiscal year resulting fron a cesse-fire b rhe fis- cal year alreacy nearly half over, the savins vi1. likely be S2 bil- Domestic Drvbablv Tne-.i prac- if Nixon have 10 less recuc'-ioro in ri'ocrani? ui r..? gvXil whoj; Elites ctrr-Jt-.t year been in the '.-.c-.gi-XirlHVd of billion. Tne cense-firi- should nvluce that fig- tire Vy nt leas: H billion. V.hilr less oit? per cent of tiie total it is a bigger portior. of [he roughly 57 billion nf :hat tho as His cmer.ll rale tliat r.o; csoood. rev- rr.ucs ill.1.'. lie t--L-X system would produce with a n.-ilional uacm- rat? of -1 ;vr cf-l. Tlii' iw. of Ihe war wns it; JIM.- when Uio "full v.is .T. :hc nl Tlii' iYfiviso IVp.irtn-.or.i cos- crilvs the .is lollows- "The full cwte of the rcprc- for.l .ill Ci-iSis incu--vM in Ihc.V.or or liu-roniemal (MSI? over A1' uiirccl ,-ind fup- frr il-..-.: ,v.v pnrl of llw ,1V b.isiN- force oofls over ,ind .ihove noriii.il ixMcc'amc opor.iline, cosls." they can smile Hcrois ie DL'C The Military presence continues elsewhere By WILLIAM BEECHER .Vew York Times Service WASHINGTON For the L'nited Slates the end of sever, b'.-ody. costly. frustrating and inconclusive years in Vietnam is no: the end of corimji- ments abroad. It will continue to have a sizable military presence. all the risks ir.volved. ir. many of the wcrid. Extensive senior strategists a; the White Hotise ar.d the defense and slate departments suggest a perception of the tlo-Diil role of the :hit is quite different from trnt ir the post- Secoiui World War era. when Sam was global in American military force is ex- pected tc remain tie cutting eage of a less but far from ist policy. Several major events have inter- vened to modify American thirkt-g, notable the historic effort toward rap- proachment with China, the moves with the Soviet Union toward mumal of strategic and greater trade, and Egypt's expulsion of Soviet military advisers and Whn; foilDn-s is a rough e-uit.e of the way ranking Adrainistralien plan- ners s'lgijificara problem and likely trends in the dispfsnicn of forces: tior ir. the Far East, temp'-ing Mos- cow. Trie United State is erploiing tie possibility of oid-Mis Co put r_i-'-i-- _bises tr Miirxrjisii should pushed v'jt of 'rnafiand or ih? 3-j- nast experts in- sist that ther; is little of such ir, the furore. 3Iicleast Europe {im ir. a o: ex- o: s Sovie: sd-ve-.- rare has o; nenibors i-ven 5.1'. io: NATO novor :vc-r s'uw.ier. The ait-tude ir. aiha-oe. Licro.i.-ir.c cefciise Europe, raises ir, 3 in t.'x> Vow sevor.il Adn-.lr-.s' such if rnr Chinese lenders th.it thoy atv fc-.irtul tontions in Asi.i rorncvl .'ilvu! .1 rc.irr.iiin-.c-.-.l offor: privipil.ilo nnd lest tins f-.irlhor Utttil Preiidert el-Sadai es- rt'ied most of if.iw to Jo.BXi So. 01 jjj Egrpt liiSt July. concErtjed a possible -curtii rcund of war b--r.ve--; and Israel, which miritt hsr- SDrift end -Ameri- can forces ir.-.i corJroLtacoa. piircer> beliere the darker of L big has beer: defused, at least temtxtrarily. bec-aus? stnzl? .Arab nor any of them, could coztc-rnrlate successful attack Israel voithoti: the assistance of So- v.et plar.es. ship; and possibly troops. The Israelis are said to share that Concern over two -norriy issues re- Firsi, as br.g as Israel maintains the riciit to attaci: ar.v .Arab country refuge ard tn .Arab is dan- ger the ge! otit of i to under- r Ciuiai in ;