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Daily Nashville Patriot Newspaper Archives Mar 26 1862, Page 1

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Daily Nashville Patriot (Newspaper) - March 26, 1862, Nashville, TennesseeMviBM T;1P PA.TOIOTa A VTA o VOL': I. : NASHVILLE, TENN.. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1862 NEW SERIES NO. 11 SUaa .Pieis PrElii.j Contrm! 11-- .. THE lISailllE PiTBIAT t?r tlic pJ.TSiSi le" prist: eg ff lie Asms, aai recent tvidiuuia of blw piterlaj from tiie naJt:e, tie Job lines of tbe Pjtw.w fcM beea n:Jde it:--; ''ar-3;a- ibxi .oru'.el.; in ;'uj Soula-Wis- t. it is suri'aed iili tie cisf ccaipeuut worler.. a. Mill lu "beiii appii.-- t-- our i i.rc tsa ct ifc li. We ire ta pr'.nt, iu th? of t!.e art. u co'or. or bront, HOtT-SILLS- , SHOT CXTJ5S. SHO .V BILLS. BALL ricizrs, 2iiLF.0.VD voiix, STTAM30A7 YVt.r.K. DRAT Ti'SLZrS, Til LOiLVS, Ar;4, izii-i- . every taiaj from ti smaliet T.p to tl:--Qaaaxa FCUX. or th least Pci;h---- t to the larjt-s- t lb iars c rcolaitoo ot the PiTairrr, grit!y irai?c-,c- J by lie M.tiOB thereto of th 1UU ef iVac!, racers it aa esct!!eni JvertLil5 sneJiuci. Xoc better la tie city. j-- w-- i !x:l orders, &t our c:Scs, No. 13 riAsxs- - KATES OF ADVERTISING (t-- c irsis ok ixss tj ausTrrn i jr-- Cji srare 1 dav tl each dd:tonl itiSTtion 504. "j Ct,3 00 each ajtiitumii br.uare 1 W fc. 2 4 i9 3 CO " 1 month 8 00 " 3 0-- - 2 " 9 C--) . - " 4 60 .4 4. 2 12 0 l ' " j " 13 0-- J " ' 8 00 "id "25 ': Id 0) rtswiBii at ruu--f&- . Oac square, cce Tear, $00 each $1 0 Wr-.i- notk--J must he given to take eat and si- p Jvartx?iECCts of yearly advertisers e the year ei;ires. otherwise e shi3 charge till Cone.i"o contract of yearly advert jcjuuls wii! be dioon-izncj- tl without previous co'.ico to u?. cor Jy ztmrs be niaJo lor lei ihaa oae year at t'--e yearly W Advertisera exceeding the epaea ccn-rect- el for will be caarfeedfor tie excess.-- TESXESSEE 5CHSERI FRIIT GAI1DEXS, AT FSAXELIS COLLEGE FITEiULESFEOil X.VSHVILLE. TENX. jJers gui'i o3"?r ti th-- ruViic over a br.n-'.p-i i icd cho:c; Fruit and Ornameniu! TI.h.K.Tu pei-io- r partoer ta3 dihg'-nti- liibon-- J i ir rurt-tha- tvreaty yers, to tie fruits !kv: a i'tij to tae Soa b. and ruautfy to enure yran,' . h u:e Ute Urtr. or tandoa & lie.-r-y has bc-c- t Uip collet turn. .SatiitTH-ir.r- !. rueas gear jrtecJ,sn'tjj, h; ,th irt;.-- ' '"Jtl;; '.tf 'l'''n' s :e,,t "Eicsa Lar?? taro oil Ar?1' .?. its r Yei.-:i:it- ;s all smili two years cl i Iras. sV); Pears 4U to 60 Cin'-s-; i'ev.Leo ljo uts: Apriru- - ati-- .3 ccr.it, una ritiu.--, i.ci Vines, Evisrrreirtis, Oriarn-nta- l t K' it jrtN tnco. C.-- 0. A. KIN' Mr.'. FAXNiX'i;. riak.Ln Col:--j..- ', T- OiLS ! OILSH OiLSIH iiETCALFE CiiOTilwiiS CO., .NASHVILLE. TKN.. 004--L OILS, 4t.iFFIXE BC?.MXti OIL, CA.50N" BrnXTXG C I., CQTW.: SPlSi'l. ou., fv ;xx oil. cap. axle oil 1:ach1n"e?.y oil, 4X, uJ ReSn-- i, CA?. AND n AG-J- (i'.'.A.-- S. ' UlFrLVri WAX HANDLES; Ezcinsivcly at T7holssalo m:; lottos ya-i- or. r.oi'S. iSXA3C:v,i AXI t'lii'iTiTKtTO," cuiTON.PL.c; Axr stp.:pi-- We refer bv r?rTiil3i-- to iitX. G I'.VviTi! Pr:ieit? ii' nf JOUS A. rii.-.-i-. i'aibi- - r :.-t of TBti:.ve. AiBO to tie fo:iOw:ng Wrutstiio ?I.jrcaaj!3 in thj riiy:itsPJ. MORRI- - i ?TRATTON .tTRATTON'tvSEYHOL'K. " OARD.VLR& CO.. " FALL CCXXLr.GHAil TERMS CASH- - Hareiil-l- y SSOASL.BY ii itLTIl, A. 1, Dtaderick tlreely XaiKviUe, Tain., tux door to JL'iulerson ISres,, p.-i,.- .! to ''- a'! trfi ?s of Piatinz, Graining.Ap.p l'ajtfr-liacgin- j, prtxM to sa.t lie Unci. jaac30-t- f. The Battles at Fort- Donelson. Cam - XrTAr. M i ;;! klei;ui;o. rdTuarr 27, 18iV2 S CiKSKKAI. A. S. ?iV: Your nr.! or of the 1-- ih of ('.is miiilh, transmit te'd tj use at Cuinberlaiiti City, rcaolicil nje same evening. It. dii-cct- me to repair at osico, with what force I could command, to t!if support of the iim rison at Fort Dow-lson- . I imme-diato- ly prepared for my departure, ar.d ellectcd it in time o rt-ac- Fort Donil -- son the next morning lHth, ln-for- day- light. 3Ie.urc had heen already takt-- by Brigadier-Gener- al Pillow, tlan in comuiand. to rentier our resistance to the attack of the cm-iii- y as cflecfive as possi- ble, lie had. with activity and indus- try, pushed forward I lie defensive works toward completion. These defenses con- sisted in an earthwork in Fort Donelson, in which were mount'-- guns of diilcrent caliber to the number f jbiitccn; a field WOTk.inlepiv ?, fo li. CTrr.stipports - anu'coTistructt-- d immedianrTV' behind the battery and upon the summit pf the hill in rear. Sweeping away from this field-wor- k eastward, to the extent of nearly two miles in its windings, was a line of inirt nchments, defended on the outside, at some points, with abattis. These in- trenebments were occupied by the troops already there, and by the addition of those who came upon the field with m.--. The position of the fort, which was es- tablished iy the Tennessee authorities, w: by no means commanding, nor was the least military significance attached to the fsilion. The intrenebments af- terwards hastily made, in main- - places, were injudiciously constructed, because of the distance they u'cre placed from the brow of the hill, subjecting the men to a heavy lire from the enemy's sharp- shooters opposite, as they advanced to or retired from the entrenchments. Soon after my arrival the infrenchments were fully occupied from one end to the other, and just as the sun ro-- e the cannonade from one of the enemy's gunboats an- nounced the owning f the conflict which was destined to continue for three davs and nights. In a short time the tire became general a!uig orr wIk.I? I ires, rind t- j- rtiioiinct aireauy planteu batteries at several points armnd the whole circuit of our i ntrenchuicnts as shown by a dia- gram heiewith sent, opened a general and active lire fr-m- i all arms upon our trenches v hich continued uuiil darkness put an end to the eonlli. t. They charged with uncommon spirit at several points along on the line, but most particularly- at a point undefended by er.trenchmenls down a hollow which separated the right wing. under Brigadier-Gener- al Buckner from the light of the center cammanded by Col. . This charge was pros- ecuted with uncommon vigor, but was met with a determined spirit of resist- ance, a cool, deliberate courage both hy the troops of Brig-de- n. Buckner and Col. Heinian. which drove the enemy, dis- comfited and cut to piece?, back upon tile position h had assumed in the morn- ing. Too high praise cannot be bestow- ed upon the battery of Capt. Porter for their participation in the rout of the en- emy in this assault. My position was immediately in front of the point of at- tack, and I was thus enabled to witness more distinctly the incidents of it. The enemy continued their lire upon difierent parts of our intrenchnients through nt tbe night, which deprived our men of every opportunity to sleep. We lay that night upon our arms in the Trenches. We confidently expected at th - dawn of da;,-- a more vigorus attack than ever. But in this we were entirely mistaken. The day advanced, and no preparation seemed to be making for a general onst t. But an extremely annoy -- inzir was kept up from the enemy's sharpshooters throughout the whole line of the inlrcnchmenis, Horn their long rang-- rilles. While this mode of not attended with and consid- erable lo-is- it nevertheless confined the men to their trem-he- s and prevented their taking their usual rest. o stood the aCairsofthe field until three o'clock r. w. when the fleet of gunboats in full forco advanced upon the fort and opened fire. They advanced in the shape of a crescent, and kept up a constant and incessant lire tor one hour arid a half which was re- plied ! with uncommon spirit and vigor bribe "fori." Once the boats reached a point wit hin one hundred yards of the "fort"' at which time it was that three of their boats sustained serious injuries from our batteries, and were compelled to fill ha-k- . The line was broken and the enemy discornfiied on the water, giv- ing up the light entirely, which he nwver aftejward renewed. 1 was satisfied from the incidents of the last two days that the enemy did not intend again to. give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very heavy slaughter, upon ellbrt to storm our posi- tion : and it was fair to infer that they would not again rti.ew the unavailing at- tempt at our disludgment, when certain means to effect the same end without loss were perfectly at their command. We were aware of the fact that ex- - s.- trenicly heavy reinforcements had been continually arriving, day and night for three da38 and nights, and : I ' had - no doubt whatever that their whole avail- able force on the western waters could and would be concentrab-- here if it wr.s deemed r.ccessaiy to reduce our position, I had already seen the impossibility of holding out any. length of time with our( inadequate nuniber and indefensible po- sition. There was no place v.ithin our iutrenchmento but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batferies. It was but fair to infer that, Avliile they kept up a suflieient lire upon our intrenebments to keep our men Trom sleep and prevent repose, their ob-ject was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both en the right and on tire left banks, and thus to cut otf all onr communications and to prevent the possibility of egress. I thus saw clearly that but one course was left by which a rational hope could be enter- tained of saving the garrison, or a part of it. That was to dislodge the enemy from his position on our left, and thus to pass our people into the ripen country, lying southward towards Nashville. 1 called p n rem. ''fr ion of the officers of divi- - JBotrsraird - bhtrades, to take place alter dark, when this plan was laid .before tbm. approved and adopted, and at which it was determined to move from the trenches at an early horn- - on the next morning, and attack the enemy in his position. It was agreed that the attack should commence upon our extreme left, and this duly was assigned Brigadier-Gener- al I'd low, by Brigadier-Gener- al Johnson, having also under his command commanders of biigades. Colonel Bald- win, commanding Mississippi and Ten- nessee troops, and Colonel Wharton and Colonel Clausland, commanding Virgini- ans.. To Brigadier-Gener- al Buckner was asbi.-nei- l the duty of making the attack from near the center of our lines upon the enemv's forces upon (he Wvnn's Ferrv road. The attack on the left was delayed longer than i expected, and consequently the enemy was lound in position when troops advanced. The attack, how- ever, on our part was extremely spirited, and although the resistance of the enemy was obstinate, and their numbers far ex- ceeded ours, our people succeeded in driving them discomfitted and terribly cut to piecc3 from the entire left. The Krnfiu-k- troons. under Briuadier-Gen- - eraJ B.irfcr..r, advanced from their ?oi tion behind the intrenchnients upon the Wyim's Ferry road, but not until the enemy had been driven in a great meas- ure from the position he occupied in ihe morning. I bad ordered o:i the night before the two regiments stationed in ''Fort Donel- son"" to occupy the trendies vacated by Brigadier-Gen- . Buckner" s forces, which, together with the men whom he marched to assist in this purpose, I thought suff- icient to hold them. My intention was to hold, with Brig.-Gc- n. Buekner's command, the Wynn's Ferry road, and thus to prevent the ene- my, during the night, from occupying the position on our loft, which he occu- pied in the morning. I gave him orders upon the field to that effect. Leaving him in position, I started for the right of our command to see that all was secure there, my intention being, if thingscould be held in the condition they then were, to move the whole army, if possible, to the open country lying southward be- yond the Randolph. Forges. During my absence. and from some misapprehension, I presume, of the previous order given, Brig.-Gc- n. Billow ordered Brig.- - Gen. Buckner to leave his position on the Wynn's Ferry road ami to resume his place in his trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed before I was aware of it. As the enemy were pressing upon the trenches, I deemed that the eieufiin of this last order was all that was left to be done. The ene- my, in fact, succeeded in occupying an angle of the trenches on the extreme right of Brig.-Oe- n. Buekner's command; and as the iresh forces of the enemy had be- gun already to move toward our left to occupy the position they held in the morning, and as we had no f.ireo ade- quate fo oppose their progress, we had to submit to llie mortification cf seeing the ground which we bad won by such a severe conliiet in the morning occupied by the enemy before midnight. The enemy had been landing reinforcements throughout the day. lli numbers had been augmented to eigh'y-ihre- ti regi- ments. Our troops v.-- re completely exhausted by four d.i33 ar.d nights of continued conflict. To renew it vt ith any hope of successful result was obi ously vain, and such I understood to be the unanimous opinion of all the officers present at the council called fo consider what was best to be done. 1 thought, ami so announced, that a desperate onset on the right, of the enemy's forces on t he ground where we had attacked them in the morning might result in the extrication of a proportion of the command from the po- sition we were in, ami this opinion I un- derstood to be concurred in ly all who were present. But it was likewise agreed, with the same uuanimity, that it would result in the slaughter of nearly all who did not succeed in effecting liie-i- r escape. The question then arose whether, ill point of humanity si ml A sonnd military polity. a co 'rse should be adopted from which tie,' probabilities were that the larger if-.i- n of the command would be cut toju'.4 - in an unavailing light against nvcr-wii-ir.i- ng numbers. I understood the genial sentiment to be adverse to the pro; jsilion. I felt that in this coniin-gcn- ;y, whilst it might be questioned, whf-ihe- I should, as commander c f the arfiij , lead it to certain destruction in an unavailing fight, yet 1 had a right indi-vidiul- ly to def ermine that T would not surv.ve a surrender there. To satisfy both propsi ions. 1 agreed to hand over the ccii' Hand to Brigadier-Gener- al B.iekner, thru'.igh Brigadier-Gener- al 1'illow, and to i , ike an effort for my own extricationbyuy and every means that might pre- sent themselves to me. I 'here fore directed Col: Forrest, a dar- ing r.nd determined ofiieer, at the head of an Mieient regiment of cavalry, to be present for the purpose of accompanying me in what I supposed would be an ef-fo- r'. to pass 'hrough the enemy's lines. I the fact upm turning the command over to Brigadier-Gen- . Buck- ner. the t 1 would bring away with me, by ;nyaieaiis I could, my own particular brigade, the propriety of which was in on alt hands. This, by va-ri- ou Hindis, 1 succeeded in accomplish- ing to a great extent, and would have r , ;bt oil my whole command in one way or anot'icr if I had had the assist- ance of licit' officers, who were absent from several of the regiments. The command was turned over to Brigadier-Ge- n. Buckner, who at once opened nego- tiations with the enemy, which resulted in ihe surrender of the place. Thus ended the conflict running through four doji and Jur tiiijuts : a large portion of which time it was maintained with the greatest fierceness and obstinacy; in which we, with a force not exceeding 13,UW, a large portion of whom were illy armed, succeeded in resisting and driving back, with discomfiture, an army of l iore than men. f have no means ol accurately estimating the loss of the enemy. From what I saw upon the battle-fiel- d; from what I witnessed throughout the whole period of the con- flict : from what I was fible to lea'-- from sources of information deemed .y me worthy of credit, I have no doubt that the inemy's loss in killed and wounded reached a number beyond fuse tJionnhh-On- own losses were extremely heavy, bnli f want of exact returns 1 am un-;- h ib Kt iyec;se number. I think- tl v will not i;e far troni i tiled and womnied. Nothing could exceed the coolness and determined spirit of resis- tance which animated the men in this long and ferocious conflict; nothing could exceed the determined courage which characterized them throughout this ter- rible struggle, and nothing could be more admirable than the steadiness which they exhibited, nature itself was ex- hausted in what they knew to be a des- perate fight against a foe very many times their superior in numbers. J cannot par- ticularize in this report to you the num- berless instances of heroic daring per- formed by both officers and men, but must content myself for the present by saying, in my judgment, they all de- serve well of their country. I have the honor to be, very respectful- ly, your obedient servant, Signed JOHN" B. FLOYD, Brigadier-Ge- n. Commanding. M'!e C'onfjrei. an !ve;f:y in'o lie !:a-yk:- s j t.n.w:.-:?:!- ;. In the Rebel House of Representatives, on March 10, Mr. Currin, of Tennessee, offered a resolution touching the manage- ment of the Quartermaster's Department in the State of Tennessee,, and especially with regard to the recent disaster fo our arms at Fort Donelson and elsewhere; and more particularly with reference to tlie action of the IJuaitermaster, Ma-jor V. K. Stevenson.of t hat service, before the surrender of the city of Nashville; and also with reference to the quantity of stores provisions, munitions of war, and hospital stores which were lost to the Goyt rnmeut at that place. A lor.g debate followed, in the course of which Mr. Atkins, of Tennessee, said that while-- investigations were being made, they should also bo made into the conduit of General Johnston. General Jo'inston had command of the entire army of the West until General Beaure- gard was sent to Columbus. He knew thit the Cumberland liver, when swollen, wcuhl aflbrd entrance into every pu t of Tennessee. He knew that the Tennessee river, at high tide, would conduct the eii'-my'- vessels into the very heart of tin- Southern Confederacy. lie knew tlut it would let th enemy on his rear. Bt t General Johnston had but one i lea a single idea to make a stand at Bewling Given. It was his great idea. Xtiiv he would not impeach the patriot- ism and chivalry of General Albert Sitl-ne- y Johnston, but it would be well enough if wc took pattern from Lincoln's Government, antl whenever a General lost a battle remove him, unless there was sufficiently strong reason andjusti-fkbl- e caue for the failure. When Gen. Johnston fdi back from Bewling Green he had between ten and fill cell thousand troops. he had en'ered Nashville he had determined to surrender it ; before be had reached the confines of that proud city of Tennessee the capital of a State whose citizens never turned their back upon the foe. During the three days of the struggle at Fort Donelson, when men stood a foot deep in blood and snow, the citizens of Tennessee showed as much gallantry as any Slate in the Confederacy. Gen. Johnston had been desired to make a stand at Nashville, but he declined do- ing if. The speaker had heard that the 1'resident had a very high opinion of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston. If such was the case, he was sorry to differ with him. The people, the army under Gen John- ston's command, and the people of Ten- nessee, had lost confidence in the mili- tary capacity of Gen. Johnston. Mr. Moore, of Kentucky, defended General, Johnston. Ife wished to give a wide scope ( investigation. It wss oiAj until of late that Gen. Johnston had as many as twenty-fiv- thonsand f liiciont men in the field. He was .asked for no reinforcements during the battle at Fort Donelson. He could not reinforce that point, for on the instant that he moved his army from the point at which he was stationed, the large force of the enemy, amounting to one hundred thousand men, would have marched on Nashville, arrd thus the whole army, instead of a portion of it, would have been captured, am! Gen. Johnston would now have been where the gallant Jen. Buckner is, in ex- ile. Gen. Johnston had no power fo prevent the passage of gunboats up the Tenne-sse- e fiver. Five steamers were lying off Nashville, and had been for six months past, and the most that he knew to work ou them all at one time was five men. He (the speaker) wanted the blame to fall where it properly belongs. What woultl have been the of making a strnd at Nashville V That beautiful city, instead of now standing, and in a condition still fo be the pride of the South if she is retaken, would, in all probability, have been in ashes. Why did not the people of Nashville them- selves fortify the city? Mr. Footc said that Gen. Johnston had called for 1,000 or 1,500 slaves to work on the fortifications, and that the call had been fully answered when Nashville was surrendered. Gen. Johnston had been importuned time and time again fo fortify Nashville, but he bad failed to do if. The people of Nashville had surren- dered every arm fhat they haa shot- guns and everything else of that sort ; those that were there had nothing to fight with. He rinder.sfoo.l lii.it ;nna vile siaiKterer nau called them cowards, n.... had asked why did not the women and children go onf and fight the foe? When the armed soldiery was Hying fast, when Generals rillow and Floyd would noi remain in it, when armed forces consi- dered it impolitic and unsafe, some one asks the question why did not the wo- men and children fight? It was the most contemptible and foul slander that ever appearetl in the columns of a news- paper, in the city of Richmond or else- where, and the man w ho perpetrated it was worthy of a place upon the scaffold. Mr. Moore said that the gentleman evidently had no reference to his speech. The resolution was passed yeas, o2 : nays, 2o. : 1'. tc ua t Cot :neroi,. 'I' lie I'rospect of 'Xrside ivttU t!ic Occupied Portion of Tcnuctuce, Nashvillk, Tenn., March 11, lfSOii. Kns. Coif.: Knowing the great inter- est of the wholesale merchants of your city in the reopening of the Southern trade. I have taken special pains to in- form nyself as to the probability of a speedy resumption of lucrative commer- cial relations with the portion of Tenne-- ssee now under the control of the Fed- eral Government. That the anxiety of yinir business men iu reference to this subject is vivid, may tvell be supposed, and that the more sanguine among them have entertained high expectations since the occupation of this city by the Fed- eral troops. I infer from your commer- cial columns. I would feel much grati- fied by being able to amioiince, that Northern trade can safely, immediately, anil profitably follow in the wake of the Northern army l this section of the country. But the result of my investi- gations does not warrant me in giving expression to any such opinion. I hole!, on the contrary, in view of.what I have seen ami learned during the lasf two weeks, that the prospect of successful mercantile ventures in this direction is rather faint, and this because 1. The only means of buying at the command oT the tradesmen and people of this vicinity are Southern fuuds. 2. The quantify of cotton, tobacco, grain, ami such other produce as might aiford a basis for an exchange trade, on store in this city, is very small. o. The mass of the agricultural popu- lation within the Federal lines is fright- ened and unfriendly, aud will not bring their productions info market until ne- cessity compels them to do so, which will not be the case for some time. In regard to reason first, it is evident, in the face of the war, and the incidental uncertainty of the fate of most Southern Banks, that an exchange of Northern goods for Southern money is the oniy mc-an- of buying, as stated, of the trades- men and people at large, hereabouts would involve a risk that no prudent shipper would wish to run. Even if the high prices that prevailed here during Ihe last six months shouId.be readily re- alized, the heavy rates of discount fo which Southern currency is subject in the North, would render profits more than questionable. The rufhlessness of thleaders of the rebellion, in this and other States, makes it very probable that manybanks will go down with the rebel cause. The books and funds of banks in this city, as well as in most towns of thiSouthern part of Middle Tennessee, have been carried off, and the same is likely to be done in Alabama, Mississippi, etc, as our troops will advance. It is proba- ble fhat the rebel leaders, whose violence will grow more desperate and unspairing, in proportion to the lessening of their chances of success, will allow them toba returned to the institutions in question. As fo the second reason, it will be re- membered that the accumulation of cot- ton was prevented by the rebel authori- ties. The blockade caused the dealers in tobacco to abstain from buying mow than local consumption required. Othcfarming produce was brought up for, ani consumed by, the rebel armies. It may be that it will not be locg- - b fore the farmers of this neighborhood will come to their senses, and bring their surplus productions into market. Butpresent appearances indicate that they will not do this, until they are fully sat- isfied of the certainty of the ultimate overthrow of the Confederate Government. For the above reasons, I am persuaded! that Northern merchants will not lose anything by not being too hastr in send-ing goods on speeulafion fo this place.Things may possibly change sooner to the better than I expect. Asmatters are situated now, however, the safest course for them will undeniably be to wait for the appearance of Nashville merchants with specie or bankable funds in. Cincin- nati. ;H.j-;i- rl Tailor Visits; Center villo :ut;l flananis-Wh- at lie lias to say. F a Ta ir s I to tbe X. Y. ?nbi:ae J I am r.ot a military man, you know. I could be easily puzzled by a dexterous use of the technology or a staff officer. Ihear, on good authority, that several of- ficers of high rank have declared to day ; " The fortifications at CenterviUe are per- fect! v imprr-gnab!c.'-r Imnregnable ' Good" . .- 1 tn 1 9 r .1 must enferiain of our gallant soldiery! 1 have seen Cerro Gordo: the position afc Centerville is not so strong yet we took Cerro Gordo. 1 have seen Chapultepeci it is five times as formidable vet we took it. J have seen Narva: the hill is twice as sleep, and twice as high yet S.030 Swedes, rushing up it, drove 50,(X)) Russians, under I'efer the "Great, from their intrenchnients. This is supposing; of course, fhat we should be so obliging as lo. attack ihe T?el..T. inct l.. ,t,w .u j ...it i hi 4 ixitjr could most easily defend, omitting the opportunities of turning their position. But it is useless to talk : I am a civilian. We have escaped a terrible danger, antf gained a great and "a bloodless victory ; I do not wish to be misunderstood as blaming any individual. I was most fa- vorably impressed, last fall with thebearing c f Gen. McClellan, and with his evident success in resolving order out of chaos. I have deprecated the popular impatience with the inaction of the army of the I'ofomac during the winter, amiinsisted that the organizing power which had moulded a demoralized military mob into obedient capacity for action-- , should be allowed fo develop its plan in. its own goo 1 time, without interference. It is for those in authority to judg? where the blame lies. But, using my eyes and my ears employing (modestly speaking) average powers of deduction 1 cannot escape the following deductions: Fir! That the topographical charac-act- er of the wsition at Manassas haa,, been vi holly misunderstood. Instead ofV a high plain, with descending tenaces, furnishing concentric lines of tlefense, it is a low plain, of which the only natural advantage is the stream of Bull Run, wit h a low bluff bank. Y:oitJ That the position at Centre-vill- e, though naturally formidable to rvn advance from Fairfax, has no flank or rear defenses, is imperfectly fortified, and. from all indications, never had any siege guns. 'J ''fd That the three or four small forts near Manassas Junction, on an open plain, do not constitute a strategic posi- tion of any importance. That f lie strongest of the re- bel works was inferior, both in construc- tion and armament, to the weakest of our forts on the Virginia side of Wash- ington. FijVt That the rebels never had, at any one time, in all the camps between Centrevilte and Manassas, more than 75,-O- 0O men. Sixth That an'advance of our whole army, made anytime since the 1st of November last, would very likely have reached Manassas with as much expedi- tion awd as little loss as the advance at this time. It is scarcely likely fhat the rebels, who have been all along so well informed as to our strength and our con- templated movements, would hive haz- arded an engagement which must have, resulted disastrously to them. ,
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